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Abstract—Privacy-preserving distributed processing has re-
cently attracted considerable attention. It aims to design solu-
tions for conducting signal processing tasks over networks in a
decentralized fashion without violating privacy. Many algorithms
can be adopted to solve this problem such as differential pri-
vacy, secure multiparty computation, and the recently proposed
distributed optimization based subspace perturbation. However,
how these algorithms relate to each other is not fully explored
yet. In this paper, we therefore first propose information-theoretic
metrics based on mutual information. Using the proposed met-
rics, we are able to compare and relate a number of existing well-
known algorithms. We then derive a lower bound on individual
privacy that gives insights on the nature of the problem. To
validate the above claims, we investigate a concrete example and
compare a number of state-of-the-art approaches in terms of
different aspects such as output utility, individual privacy and
algorithm robustness against the number of corrupted parties,
using not only theoretical analysis but also numerical validation.
Finally, we discuss and provide principles for designing appro-
priate algorithms for different applications.
Index Terms—Distributed processing, differential privacy,
secure multiparty computation, subspace perturbation,
information-theoretic, privacy-utility metric, consensus.
I. INTRODUCTION
Big data is accompanied by big challenges. Currently,
data are collected and simultaneously stored on various local
devices, such as phones, tablets and wearable devices [1], [2].
In these cases, three critical challenges exist in processing such
large amounts of data: (1) the emerging demand for distributed
signal processing tools, as these devices are distributed in
nature and often rely on wireless communication to form
a network that allows devices to cooperate for solving a
problem; (2) the requirement for both computational and
communication efficient solutions, due to the fact that these
devices are usually resource-constrained, for example in wire-
less sensor networks; and (3) privacy concerns, as sensors
from these devices, such as GPS and cameras, usually contain
sensitive personal information. Consequently, having efficient
privacy-preserving distributed processing solutions, which are
able to address the privacy concerns, is highly important
and usually requires interdisciplinary research across fields
Q. Li and M. G. Christensen are with the Audio Analysis Lab, CRE-
ATE, Aalborg University, Rendsburggade 14, Aalborg, Denmark (emails:
{qili,mgc}@create.aau.dk).
J. S. Gundersen is with the Department of Mathematical Sciences, Aalborg
University, Skjernvej 4A, Aalborg, Denmark (e-mail: jaron@math.aau.dk).
R. Heusdens is with the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA), Het
Nieuwe Diep 8, 1781 AC Den Helder, The Netherlands, and with the
Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, Delft
University of Technology, Mekelweg 4, 2628 CD Delft, The Netherlands
(email: r.heusdens@{mindef.nl,tudelft.nl}).
such as distributed signal processing, information theory and
cryptography.
Before describing related studies, we first introduce an im-
portant concept called security model. There are two primary
types of security models: (1) computational security, in which
the adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded such
that it cannot decrypt a secret efficiently (i.e., in polynomial
time) and (2) information-theoretic security, in which the
adversary is assumed to be computationally unbounded but
does not have sufficient information for inferring the secret.
In this paper we focus on information-theoretic security since
it assumes a stronger adversary and is more efficient in terms
of both communication and computational demands [3].
A. Related works
Many information-theoretic approaches have been proposed
for addressing privacy issues in various distributed processing
problems like distributed average consensus [4]–[16], dis-
tributed least squares [17], [18], distributed optimization [19]–
[27] and distributed graph filtering [28]. These approaches can
be broadly classified into three classes. The first two classes
combine distributed signal processing with commonly used
cryptographic tools, such as secure multiparty computation
(SMPC) [29], [30], and privacy primitives, such as differential
privacy (DP) [31], [32], respectively. The third class directly
explores the potential of existing distributed signal processing
tools for privacy preservation, such as distributed optimization
based subspace perturbation (DOSP) [7], [18], [27]. Among
these approaches, SMPC aims to securely compute a function
over a number of parties’ private data without revealing it. DP,
on the other hand, is defined to ensure that the posterior guess
relating to the private data is only slightly better (quantified
by ) than the prior guess. While DOSP protects the private
data by inserting noise in a specific subspace determined by
the graph topology.
There are three challenges in addressing the privacy issues
for distributed processing. (1) There is no generic framework
that is able to relate and quantify all existing algorithms,
because each approach, e.g., SMPC, DP or DOSP, has its
own metrics and features. Additionally, there are also many
cases, for example distributed average consensus, in which
SMPC, DOSP and DP are exclusive with respect to each
other, e.g., a SMPC based algorithm can never be differentially
private. Therefore, it is very difficult to choose an appropriate
algorithm given a specific application at hand. (2) Apply
these approaches directly to distributed processing does not
always guarantee the performance. As SMPC and DP were
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2not originally defined in the context of distributed processing,
there are cases where they cannot protect the private data from
being revealed to others. As an example, a perfect SMPC
protocol does not necessarily prevent privacy leakage and a
perfect DP based approach ( = 0) does not imply zero
information leakage if the private data are correlated [33]. (3)
It is very challenging to analyze and visualize the information-
theoretical results. Due to the fact that distributed processing
algorithms are usually iterative, it is thus very complex to
analytically track the privacy analysis over all iterations. In
addition to this, visualization of related theoretical results,
which will help to validate and understand the algorithm
performances, is also rarely explored in the literature. In
this paper, we attempt to overcome the above mentioned
challenges.
B. Paper contributions
The main contributions are summarized below.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
proposing formal information-theoretic metrics that are
able to quantify output utility, individual privacy and
algorithm robustness in the context of privacy-preserving
distributed processing. The proposed metrics are general,
where well-known frameworks such as DP and SMPC
can be considered as special cases.
• We derive both a lower bound on individual privacy
and a condition that ensures that DP and SMPC/DOSP
are mutually exclusive. These results not only help to
understand the nature of the problem but also gives
guidance on designing algorithms.
• By applying into a concrete example, we are able to
analyze, quantify, compare, and understand the nature
of a number of different privacy-preserving algorithms
including DP, SMPC and DOSP. In addition, we also
visualize all the information-theoretical results with nu-
merical validations.
C. Outline and notation
This paper is organized as follows. Section II states the
problem to be solved. Section III briefly reviews SMPC
and DP, and then discusses their limitations in quantifying
privacy-preserving distributed processing protocols. Section IV
introduces the proposed metrics and relate them to both DP
and SMPC. Additionally, a lower bound on individual privacy
is given. Sections V and VI describe a concrete example, i.e.,
distributed average consensus. The former section defines the
problem and shows that traditional approaches leak private
information, while the latter section first presents a theoretical
result for achieving privacy-preservation and then analyzes
existing privacy-preserving distributed average consensus al-
gorithms using the proposed metrics. Comparisons, numerical
results, and discussions are given in Section VII, and Section
VIII concludes the paper.
We use lowercase letters (x) for scalars, lowercase bold-
face letters (x) for vectors, uppercase boldface letters (X)
for matrices, overlined uppercase letters (X¯) for subspaces,
calligraphic letters (X ) for arbitrary sets and | · | for the
cardinality of a set. Uppercase letters (X) denote random
variables having realizations x. span{·} and null{·} denote
the span and nullspace of their argument, respectively. (X)†
and (X)> denote the Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse and
transpose of X , respectively. xi denotes the i-th entry of the
vector x and Xij denotes the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix X .
0, 1 and I denote the vectors with all zeros and all ones, and
the identity matrix of appropriate size, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the problem setup and the
adversary models. We then state the three main requirements
to be addressed.
A. Privacy-preserving distributed processing over networks
A network can be modelled as a graph G = {N , E} where
N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of n nodes and E ⊆ N ×
N denotes the set of m edges. Let Ni = {j | (i, j) ∈ E}
denote the neighborhood of node i and di = |Ni|. Denote
el = (i, j) ∈ E , where l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, as the l-th edge, and let
B ∈ Rm×n be the graph incidence matrix defined as Bli = 1,
Blj = −1 if and only if (i, j) ∈ E and i < j. Assume each
node i has private data si and let s = [s1, . . . , sn]>. Note that
for simplicity, si is assumed to be scalar but the results can
easily be generalized to arbitrary dimensions.
The goal of privacy-preserving distributed processing over
a network is to compute a function
f : Rn 7→ Rn,y = f(s), (1)
in a distributed manner without revealing each node’s private
data si to other nodes, where yi denotes the desired output
of node i. By a distributed manner we mean that only data
exchange between neighboring nodes is allowed.
B. Adversary model
An adversary model is used to evaluate the robustness of the
system under different security attacks. The adversary works
by colluding a number of nodes, and it aims to conduct certain
malicious activities such as inferring the private data. These
colluding nodes are referred to as corrupted nodes, and the
others are called honest nodes. In this paper, we consider two
types of adversary models: passive and eavesdropping. The
passive adversary model is a typical model to be addressed in
distributed networks [34]. It assumes that the corrupted nodes
are honest-but-curious, that is, these corrupted nodes follow
the algorithm instructions but will share information together
to infer the private data of the honest nodes.
An eavesdropping adversary, on the other hand, is assumed
to listen on all communication channels between nodes with
the purpose of inferring the private data of the honest nodes.
The eavesdropping adversary model is relatively unexplored
in the context of privacy-preserving distributed processing.
Indeed, many SMPC based approaches, such as those based
on secret sharing [17], [19], [35], assume that all messages
are transmitted through securely encrypted channels [36] such
that the communication channels cannot be eavesdropped.
3However, channel encryption is computationally demanding
and is, therefore, very expensive for iterative algorithms, such
as those considered here.
C. Main requirements
We identify three important factors to be considered when
designing a privacy-preserving distributed processing algo-
rithm:
1) Output utility: at the end of the algorithm, each node
would like to obtain its desired output yi. As the goal is
to not compromise the accuracy of output by considering
privacy, we thus consider the output of traditional dis-
tributed processing approaches, i.e., without any privacy
concern, as the baseline. Hence, the desired output
is defined as the one computed by a traditional non-
privacy-preserving algorithm.
2) Individual privacy: during the entire algorithm execu-
tion, each node wants to prevent its private data si from
being revealed to others.
3) Algorithm robustness: the algorithm should be able to
preserve privacy in the presence of a large number of
corrupted nodes.
III. SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION AND
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
This section briefly introduces two widely used techniques
for privacy-preservation: SMPC and DP, and discuss their lim-
itations in quantifying the performance of privacy-preserving
distributed processing algorithms.
A. Secure multiparty computation
An important concept in SMPC is the definition of an ideal
world, in which a trusted third party (TTP) is assumed to be
available. A TTP works by first computing the function result
y = f(s) after collecting all private data from each node and
then sending the desired outputs yi to each and every node.
This scenario is considered secure since a TTP is assumed non-
corrupted. However, there is a distinction between security and
privacy. We remark that an ideal world does not necessarily
guarantee zero privacy leakage. This is because the passive
adversary always has the knowledge of the private data and
desired output of the corrupted nodes. This knowledge can
leak information about the private data si of honest node i,
which can be quantified by
I(Si; {Sj , Yj}j∈Nc), (2)
where Nc denotes the set of corrupted nodes and I(· ; ·)
denotes mutual information [37]. Apparently, this information
loss is not necessarily zero and it is indeed dependent on
several factors such as the function type and whether the
private data are correlated or not.
The motivation of SMPC comes from the fact that in
practice a third party might not be available or trustworthy.
The goal of SMPC is thus to design a protocol that can replace
a TTP. Therefore, a SMPC protocol is considered to be perfect
whenever the adversary does not learn more about each honest
node’s private data than what is already revealed in an ideal
world as quantified in (2). Again, a perfect SMPC protocol
does not imply zero information leakage (but only means that
it successfully replaces a TTP).
As an example in which SMPC violates individual privacy,
consider the situation in which y is a permuted version of
the private data s. That is, yi = si− 1 modn. Then, if node i is
corrupted, the private data of node i− 1 modn will be revealed
regardless of the SMPC protocol. Therefore, we conclude that
SMPC based approaches might not preserve privacy at all,
and using SMPC metrics are thus insufficient for quantifying
the performance of privacy-preserving distributed processing
algorithms.
B. Differential privacy
DP is a protocol that can be used when recruiting a person
to participate in distributed processing. DP aims to protect this
person’s privacy in an extreme case where all other persons
are assumed to be not trust-worthy. That is, there are n − 1
corrupted nodes and only one honest node, say node i, i.e.,
Nc = N \ {i}. To emulate such a scenario, let s′ ∈ Rn be an
adjacent vector of s where ∀j ∈ Nc : s′j = sj and s′i 6= si.
Let Y denote the output range of a function f . Given  ≥ 0,
an algorithm achieves -DP if for any pair of adjacent vectors
s and s′, and for all sets Ys ⊆ Y , we have
P (f(s) ∈ Ys) ≤ eP (f(s′) ∈ Ys). (3)
Note that the adversary model considered in DP is different
from the previously defined passive adversary model: the
former assumes that the adversary knows the function outputs
given two adjacent vectors s and s′. While the latter assumes
that both the private data and function outputs of the corrupted
nodes are known to the adversary. Consequently,  = 0 does
not imply zero information leakage if the private data are
correlated since I(Si; {Yj , Sj}j∈Nc) 6= 0. We conclude that
applying DP directly to distributed processing does not always
guarantee privacy and DP is not sufficient for quantifying the
privacy.
IV. PROPOSED METRICS AND BOUNDS
This section starts by introducing the proposed metrics
and in particular we present a lower bound on individual
privacy. After that, we will relate the proposed metric to both
SMPC and DP. The proposed metrics (ui, ρi, ki) are for each
individual node and are defined as follows.
A. Output utility ui
Information-theoretic approaches achieve privacy-
preservation mainly by using data obfuscation/perturbation
through noise insertion. Let r ∈ Rn denote the inserted noise
realization. The estimated function output is given by
yˆ = f(s, r).
Note that the desired function output y can be seen as a special
case where no noise is inserted:
y = f(s,0).
4To define an information-theoretic utility measure, mutual
information has been widely adopted in the literature [38],
[39]. Here, we also use mutual information to define the output
utility:
∀i ∈ N : ui = I(Yi; Yˆi). (4)
We can see that ui ∈ [0, I(Yi;Yi)] and ui = I(Yi;Yi) means
full utility. In theory, if Yi is a discrete random variable we
have I(Yi;Yi) = H(Yi) where H(·) denotes the Shannon
entropy and I(Yi;Yi) = +∞ if Yi is a continuous random
variable. Note that in practice we only deal with the former
case as computers can only process discretized data.
B. Individual privacy ρi
When defining privacy, the -DP shown in (3) has been
widely used because it is a worst-case metric that provides
a strong privacy assurance in any situation, e.g., for all prior
distributions of the private data. However, besides the problem
of not working for correlated data, such strong assurances can
be very difficult to guarantee in practice [40]–[42]. In addition,
this worst-case privacy leakage can in practice be quite far
from the typical leakage of the average user [43]. For these
reasons, many relaxations of -DP have been proposed [44]–
[47]. In this paper we will deploy mutual information as the
individual privacy metric; it is a relaxation of DP since it
is an average metric. To quantify the individual privacy of
honest node i ∈ Nh where Nh = N \ Nc denote the set of
honest nodes, we first denote Vi as the set of random variables
which contains all the information collected by the adversary
for inferring the private data si. The individual privacy is thus
defined as
∀i ∈ Nh : ρi = I(Si,Vi). (5)
1) lower bound on individual privacy: The individual pri-
vacy ρi is lower bounded by
ρi,min = I(Si; {Sj , Yˆj}j∈Nc). (6)
This is due to {Sj , Yˆj}j∈Nc being the minimum knowledge
available to the adversary. Let Vi,min = {Sj , Yˆj}j∈Nc . Imagine
the whole distributed processing as a blackbox with s as
inputs and yˆ as the output. Recall the definition of the passive
adversary model, by controlling a number of corrupted nodes
the adversary always has the knowledge of their private data
and estimated outputs, regardless of the algorithm adopted
(i.e., independent of the information flow within the black-
box). Therefore, we conclude that Vi,min ⊆ Vi, thus also
ρi,min ≤ ρi. Notably, this lower bound becomes (2) in SMPC
when full utility yˆ = y is achieved.
Here we propose a new definition of perfect individual
privacy in the context of distributed processing. Intuitively,
perfect individual privacy means zero information leakage, i.e.,
ρi = 0. However, due to the fact that the lower bound ρi,min
is not necessarily zero since it is dependent on several factors
such as the type of function, the estimated output and the
number of corrupted nodes, it is thus impossible to achieve
zero information loss if ρi,min > 0. Therefore, we introduce
the following definition.
Definition 1. (Perfect individual privacy in the context of
privacy-preserving distributed processing.) Given ρi,min ∈
[0, I(Si;Si)), a privacy-preserving algorithm is perfect (i.e.,
achieves perfect individual privacy) if it reaches the lower
bound, i.e., ρi = ρi,min.
C. Algorithm robustness ki
The algorithm robustness is quantified by ki ∈ {0, . . . , n−
1}, which measures the maximum number of corrupted nodes
that can be tolerated under a passive adversary. ki = n −
1 means the algorithm is able to protect the private data si
from being revealed even if all other nodes in the network are
corrupted. Note that the algorithm robustness is defined under
a passive adversary model. For the case of an eavesdropping
adversary, we will address it by the cost of channel encryption.
D. Linking the proposed metrics to SMPC and DP
The proposed metrics (ui, ρi, ki) are closely related to the
well-known SMPC and DP:
1) They reduce to perfect SMPC when ∀i ∈ N : ui =
I(Yi;Yi) and ∀i ∈ Nh : ρi = ρi,min. As shown in
Section III-A, perfect SMPC requires full utility and
no additional information can be leaked except for (2),
which is exactly quantified by ρi,min when yˆ = y.
2) They reduce to relaxed -DP when ki = n − 1 (i.e.,
Nc = N \ {i}) and all private data are assumed to be
uncorrelated. That is, if all Si, i ∈ N are independent
with each other, (6) becomes
ρi,min = I(Si; {Yˆj}j∈Nc |{Sj}j∈Nc)
+ I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc)
= I(Si; {Yˆj}j∈Nc |{Sj}j∈Nc). (7)
The above conditional mutual information is fundamen-
tally related to DP and has been proved to be a relaxation
of -DP [44].
V. EXAMPLE I: DISTRIBUTED AVERAGE CONSENSUS
To demonstrate the benefits of the proposed metrics and
the effect of the lower bound on individual privacy, we use
the distributed average consensus as a canonical example.
Two main reasons for choosing this problem are that it has
general applicability in many signal processing tasks, such as
denoising [48] and interpolation [49], and that its privacy-
preserving solutions have been widely investigated in the
literature [4]–[16].
In this section, we first define the problem. After that, we
introduce traditional distributed average consensus approaches
and prove that they exhibit privacy leakages. Before describing
the details, we first state the following assumptions. LetNi,c =
Ni ∩Nc and Ni,h = Ni ∩Nh denote the set of corrupted and
honest neighbors of node i, respectively.
Assumption 1. The private data si of each node is indepen-
dent of those of the other nodes, i.e., ∀i, j ∈ N , i 6= j :
I(Si;Sj) = 0.
5Assumption 2. The passive adversary has knowledge of the
size of the network n, each node’s neighborhood size di; and
every honest node has a non-empty corrupted neighborhood,
i.e., ∀i ∈ Nh : Ni,c 6= ∅.
A. Problem definition
The goal of the distributed average consensus is to compute
the global average of all the private data over the network, i.e.,
y = save1, (8)
where save = n−1
∑
i∈N si. Hence, we have that y =
n−111>s. As the nodes in the network can only communicate
with the neighboring nodes, the solution is obtained iteratively.
Many approaches have been proposed to achieve this goal.
Below, we introduce two types of approaches that serve as
baselines for the coming section.
B. Distributed linear iteration approaches
Distributed average consensus can be obtained by applying,
at every iteration t ∈ T where T = {1, . . . , T}, a linear
transformation W ∈ W where
W = {W ∈ Rn×n|Wij = 0 if (i, j) /∈ E and i 6= j} , (9)
such that the state value x is updated by
x(t+1) = Wx(t),
and it is initialized with the private data, i.e.,
x(0) = s. (10)
The structure of W reflects the connectivity of the net-
work1. In order to correctly compute the average, that is,
x(t) → y = n−111>s as t → ∞, necessary and sufficient
conditions for W are given by
(i) 1>W = 1>,
(ii) W1 = 1,
(iii) α
(
W − 11>n
)
< 1,
where α(·) denotes the spectral radius [50].
Privacy leakage: As the state values x(t)i should be exchanged
between nodes, based on Assumption 2 we have X(0)i ∈ Vi.
Thus,
ρi ≥ I(Si, X(0)i ) = I(Si, Si).
We conclude that, as expected, the traditional distributed linear
iteration algorithm is not privacy-preserving at all.
1For simplicity, we assume that W is constant for every iteration, which
corresponds to a synchronous implementation of the algorithm. In the case of
an asynchronous implementation, the transformation depends on which node
will update. The results shown here are easily generalized to asynchronous
systems by working with expected values.
C. Distributed optimization approaches
Distributed average consensus can also be formed as an
equivalent linear-constrained convex optimization problem
given by
min
xi
∑
i∈N
1
2
‖xi − si‖22
s.t. xi = xj ,∀(i, j) ∈ E ,
(11)
Many distributed optimizers have been proposed to solve the
above problem, such as ADMM [51] and PDMM [52], [53].
Here, we provide an example using PDMM, its extended
augmented Lagrangian function is given by:
1
2
‖x− s‖22 + (Pλ(t))TCx+
c
2
‖Cx+ PCx(t)‖22, (12)
and the updating equations are
x(t+1) =
(
I + cC>C
)−1 (
s− cC>PCx(t) −C>Pλ(t)
)
,
(13)
λ(t+1) = Pλ(t) + c(Cx(t+1) + PCx(t)), (14)
where c > 0 is a constant for controlling the convergence rate.
λ ∈ R2m denotes the introduced dual variable and matrix C ∈
R2m×n is related to the graph incidence matrix B. Let the
subscript i|j be a directed identifier that denotes the directed
edge from node i to j and i, j be an undirected identifier.
In PDMM, each edge el = (i, j) ∈ E corresponds two dual
variables: λl = λi|j , λl+m = λj|i and two rows in matrix C:
Cli = Bi|j = 1, C(l+m)j = Bj|i = −1 if and only if i <
j. Of note, P ∈ R2m×2m denotes a symmetric permutation
matrix which flips the upper m with the lower m rows of
the matrix it applies. Thus, ∀(i, j) ∈ E : λj|i = (Pλ)i|j and
C + PC = [B>B>]>.
The local updating functions for each node become
x
(t+1)
i =
si +
∑
j∈Ni
(
cx
(t)
j −Bi|jλ(t)j|i
)
1 + cdi
, (15)
λ
(t+1)
i|j = λ
(t)
j|i + c
(
Bi|jx
(t+1)
i +Bj|ix
(t)
j
)
. (16)
x(t) has been proven to converge geometrically (linearly on
a logarithmic scale) to optimum x∗ = save1, given arbitrary
initialization of both x and λ.
Privacy leakage: By inspecting (15) we can see that the
privacy leakage about si depends not only on x but also on λ.
It is thus important also to analyze the convergence behavior of
the dual variable λ. We first consider two successive λ-update
in (14) given by
λ(t+2) = λ(t) + c(Cx(t+2) + 2PCx(t+1) +Cx(t)), (17)
as P 2 = I . Let H¯ = span(C) + span(PC) and H¯⊥ =
null(C>) ∩ null((PC)>). We can see that every two λ-
updates affect only ΠH¯λ ∈ H¯ where ΠH¯ denotes the
orthogonal projection onto H¯ . It is proven that if λ(0) ∈ H¯ ,
the dual variable will be ensured to converge to an optimum
λ∗ [52] given by
λ∗ = −
(
C>
(PC)>
)†(
x∗ − s+ cC>Cx∗
x∗ − s+ cC>PCx∗
)
+ cCx∗.
(18)
6Note that the traditional distributed optimizer generally ini-
tializes λ(0) ∈ H¯ to ensure that λ → λ∗. To do so, zero
initialization is the simplest way as it does not require any
coordination between nodes. In addition, zero initialization of
both x and λ give the smallest initial error resulting in the
smallest number of iterations to converge. As a consequence,
by inspecting (15) we have
x
(1)
i =
si
1 + cdi
. (19)
As the constant c is globally known to all nodes and the
neighborhood size di is known to the adversary based on
Assumption 2, the private data si can be reconstructed by the
adversary. We thus have
ρi ≥ I(Si, X(1)i ) = I(Si, Si),
as X(1)i ∈ Vi. Hence, we conclude that traditional distributed
optimization algorithms leak private information.
VI. EXAMPLE II: PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED
AVERAGE CONSENSUS
In the previous section, we showed that information about
the private data is revealed during the data exchange step. As
a consequence, one way to protect privacy is to not exchange
private data directly, but to insert noise to obtain an obfuscated
version and then exchange the obfuscated data with other
nodes. In what follows, we will first present an information-
theoretic result regarding using noise insertion to achieve
privacy-preservation. After that, we will introduce existing
privacy-preserving distributed average consensus approaches
and quantify their performances using the proposed metrics.
A. Noise insertion for privacy preservation
Proposition 1. (Arbitrary small information loss can be
achieved through noise insertion.) Let private data s and
inserted noise r denote a realization of independent random
variable S and R with variance σ2S , σ
2
R < ∞, respectively.
Let Z = S + R. Given arbitrary small  ∈ R>0, there exists
σ2R that satisfies
I(S;Z) ≤ . (20)
In addition, σ2R is bounded by
σ2R ≥
σ2S
22 − 1 , (21)
if we choose to insert Gaussian noise.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Based on the design of the noise insertion process, we
broadly classified existing approaches into two classes: zero-
sum noise insertion and subspace noise insertion. We first
introduce the former case, the main idea of zero-sum noise
insertion comes from the nature of the distributed average
consensus. Let ri denote the noise added by node i; the
estimated output is thus given by
yˆi =
1
n
∑
i∈N
(si + ri) = yi +
1
n
∑
i∈N
ri. (22)
Clearly, if the sum of all inserted noise is zero, full output
utility will be achieved as ∀i ∈ N , yˆi = yi. Now we will
proceed to introduce two different approaches, including DP
and SMPC, which aim to insert zero-sum noise in a distributed
manner.
B. Statistical zero-sum noise insertion using DP
DP-based approaches [8]–[10] mostly apply zero-mean
noise insertion to achieve zero-sum in a statistical sense.
Variants exist in designing the noise insertion process, here
we give one simple example to illustrate the main idea: each
node i initialize its state value by adding zero-mean noise ri
to its private data. That is, the state value initialization (10) is
replaced with
∀i ∈ N : x(0)i = si + ri, (23)
and then arbitrary distributed averaging algorithms (e.g.,
linear iterations or distributed optimization) can be adopted
to compute the average.
1) Output utility analysis: Assume that all inserted noise
are independent and identically distributed random variables
with zero-mean and variance σ2. Denote r =
∑
i∈N ri and
r¯ = rn as the sum of all inserted noise and its average,
respectively; thus, R and R¯ are also zero-mean, and their
variances are nσ2 and σ
2
n , respectively. Based on (22) the
output utility of node i is
∀i ∈ N : ui = I(Yi;Yi + R¯). (24)
2) Lower bound analysis: As mentioned in Section III-B,
DP assumes n−1 corrupted nodes implyingNc = {j}j∈N ,j 6=i.
With Assumption 1 the lower bound on individual privacy
reduces to (7). Therefore,
ρi,min = I(Si;Yi + R¯|{Sj}j∈Nc)
(a)
= I(Si;
∑
j∈N
Sj +R|{Sj}j∈Nc)
(b)
= I(Si;
∑
j∈N
Sj +R, {Sj}j∈Nc)− I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc)
(c)
= I(Si;Si +R, {Sj}j∈Nc)
(d)
= I(Si;Si +R), (25)
where (a) comes from Assumption 2 that n is known to
the adversary; (b) comes from the definition of conditional
mutual information; (c) holds as I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc) = 0 from
Assumption 1 and the fact Si + R, {Sj}j∈Nc is a sufficient
statistic of
∑
j∈N Sj + R, {Sj}j∈Nc ; (d) holds from the fact
that {Sj}j∈Nc is independent of Si +R.
3) Individual privacy analysis: Denote vector X(t) =
[X
(t)
1 , . . . , X
(t)
n ]>, with n − 1 corrupted nodes all the infor-
mation seen by the adversary over the algorithm is
Vi = {Yˆj , Sj , Rj , X(t)}j∈Nc,t∈T , (26)
where Yˆi = X
(T )
i . We can see that computing I(Si;Vi)
requires to analyze the information flow over the whole
iterative process, this imposes challenges as keeping track
7of information loss throughout all iterations is difficult. We,
therefore, simplify the privacy analysis through the following
result.
Remark 1. (Information release after the initialization step
does not leak additional information.) For all iterations t ≥ 1,
the sequence Si → X(0) → X(t) forms a Markov chain; on
the basis of the data processing inequality [37], we have
∀t ≥ 1 : I(Si;X(0)) ≥ I(Si;X(t)). (27)
We conclude that analyzing the individual privacy by using
the information flow in the initialization is sufficient, i.e.,
I(Si;X
(0)) = I(Si;X
(0), X(1), . . . , X(T )). (28)
Given the above Remark, we have
I(Si;Vi) =I(Si; {Sj , Rj , X(0)}j∈Nc)
=I(Si;X
(0)
i |{Sj , Rj , X(0)j }j∈Nc)
+ I(Si; {Sj , Rj , X(0)j }j∈Nc)
=I(Si;X
(0)
i ), (29)
where the last equality holds, as {Sj , Rj , X(0)j }j∈Nc is in-
dependent of both Si and X
(0)
i . The individual privacy thus
becomes
ρi = I(Si;Si +Ri). (30)
In conclusion, with the proposed metrics DP based approaches
achieve(
I(Yi;Yi + R¯), I(Si;Si +Ri) ≥ I(Si;Si +R), n− 1
)
.
By inspecting the above result, we have the following remark.
Remark 2. (In the distributed average consensus, DP always
has a trade-off between the output utility and individual
privacy.) As both output utility (24) and individual privacy
(30) are dependent on the inserted noise, with Proposition
1 we describe two extreme cases based on the variance of
inserted noise:
σ2 →∞⇒ ui = 0, ρi = 0, (31)
σ2 = 0⇒ ui = I(Yi;Yi), ρi = I(Si;Si). (32)
Hence DP has a trade-off between privacy and utility. Of
note, the conclusion that DP based approaches can not achieve
full utility has been shown in [10]; here, we provide a simpler
proof in terms of mutual information.
C. Exact zero-sum noise insertion using SMPC
Unlike the DP based approaches, which have a privacy-
utility trade-off, the SMPC based approaches have a feature of
ensuring full utility without compromising privacy. However,
there is no free lunch; the price is that the robustness over n−1
corrupted nodes is no longer achievable. Existing SMPC based
approaches [4]–[6] have applied additive secret sharing [30]
to construct exact zero-sum noise through coordinated noise
insertion. To do so, each node i first sends each neighbor
j ∈ Ni a random number rji and receives a random number
rij from each of its neighbors. After that node i constructs its
noise by
ri =
∑
j∈Ni
ri|j , (33)
where
ri|j = rij − rji . (34)
Of note, all the random numbers {rji }(i,j)∈E are independent
of each other. After constructing noise, similar as DP based
approaches, each node initializes its state value using (23) and
then arbitrary distributed averaging algorithm can be adopted.
1) Output utility analysis: In SMPC the noise is constructed
such that they all sum to zero:∑
i∈N
ri =
∑
(i,j)∈E
ri|j = 0, (35)
as ri|j = −rj|i. Full utility is thus obtained as yˆi = yi:
∀i ∈ N : ui = I(Yi;Yi). (36)
2) Lower bound analysis: With full utility, the lower bound
(7) becomes
ρi,min = I(Si; {Yj}j∈Nc |{Sj}j∈Nc)
(a)
= I(Si;
∑
j∈Nh
Sj), (37)
where (a) holds on the basis of Assumption 1 and 2.
3) Individual privacy analysis: Let Ec = {(i, j) ∈
E , (i, j) /∈ Nh × Nh} denote the set of corrupted edges.
For arbitrary honest node i ∈ Nh, all information that the
adversary sees through the algorithm is given by
Vi = {{Sj}j∈Nc ,
∑
j∈N
Sj , {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec , {X(t)}t∈T },
where
∑
j∈N sj = nsave is known as the adversary knows
both n and correct average save; full vector X(t) is known
because of Assumption 2. Let G′h denote the component (i.e.,
connected subgraph) consisting of node i after removal of all
corrupted nodes; its node set is denoted by N ′h ⊆ Nh. We have
the following result which simplifies the individual privacy
analysis.
Proposition 2. Given Vi, information flow within the sub-
graph G′h provides a sufficient statistic for inferring Si. More
specifically, we have
∀i ∈ N ′h : I(Si;Vi) = I(Si; {Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h
Rj|k}j∈N ′h). (38)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
With the knowledge of {Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h Rj|k}j∈N ′h , the
adversary has different ways to infer information about Si for
example by looking at (1) the term I(Si;Si +
∑
j∈Ni,h Ri|j)
in which we can see that node i should have at least one
honest neighbor, i.e., Ni,h 6= ∅, otherwise Si will be revealed;
therefore, among the neighboring nodes the maximum number
8of corrupted nodes can be tolerated is ki = di − 1; (2) the
partial sum of subgraph G′h: I(Si;
∑
j∈N ′h Sj) since∑
j∈N ′h
Sj =
∑
j∈N ′h
(Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h
Rj|k), (39)
as Rj|k = −Rk|j from (34). Since this partial sum can always
be determined regardless of the amount of noise insertion, we
then have
I(Si;Vi) ≥ I(Si;
∑
j∈N ′h
Sj). (40)
Due to Proposition 1 we conclude that the minimum infor-
mation loss I(Si;
∑
j∈N ′h Sj) can be achieved through noise
insertion. The individual privacy is thus given by
ρi = I(Si;
∑
j∈N ′h
Sj). (41)
In conclusion, with the proposed metrics SMPC based ap-
proaches achieve(
I(Yi;Yi), I(Si;
∑
j∈N ′h
Sj) ≥ I(Si;
∑
j∈Nh
Sj), di − 1
)
. (42)
Remark 3. (Conditions for achieving perfect individual pri-
vacy and full output utility using the SMPC based approaches
in the distributed average consensus.) Given Definition 1, by
inspecting (42) we conclude that the SMPC based approaches
is able to achieve both full output utility and perfect individual
privacy if ∀i ∈ Nh : N ′h = Nh and |Nh| ≥ 2, i.e., the graph
is still connected after removal of all corrupted nodes.
The main limitation of the above zero-sum noise insertion
approaches is that it is hard to be generalized to problems other
than distributed average consensus. To mitigate this problem,
subspace noise insertion approach proposed to exploit the
graph structure of distributed signal processing. Below, we
introduce a recently proposed approach called distributed
optimization based subspace perturbation (DOSP).
D. Subspace noise insertion using DOSP
The DOSP approach [7], [27] is distinct from both the
DP and SMPC based approaches, because it can ensure full
utility without compromising privacy and does not require
coordinated noise insertion. In particular, DOSP does not
introduce additional variables for noise insertion but exploit
the dual variable to construct the noise. By inspecting (15),
the noise for each node i is constructed as
∀t ∈ T : r(t)i =
∑
j∈Ni
(Bi|jλ
(t)
j|i), (43)
in which the dual variables of the corrupted neighbors, i.e.,
{λ(t)j|i}j∈Ni,c are known to the adversary. As shown in [52],
the dual variable λ(t) composites of two parts: the convergent
component ΠH¯λ(t) → λ∗ and the non-convergent component
(I−ΠH¯)λ(t) = P t (I −ΠH¯)λ(0) where P 2 = I . Therefore,
we have∑
j∈Ni,h
(Bi|jλ
(t)
j|i) =
∑
j∈Ni,h
(Bi|j(ΠH¯λ
(t))j|i)
+
∑
j∈Ni,h
(
Bi|j(P t(I −ΠH¯)λ(0))j|i
)
(44)
The main idea of subspace noise insertion is to ex-
ploit the non-convergent component of the dual variables
as subspace noise for guaranteeing the privacy. That is,∑
j∈Ni,h
(
Bi|j(P t(I −ΠH¯)λ(0))j|i
)
is to protect the private
data si of honest node i from being revealed to others. Because
it only depends on the initialization and thus its variance can
be made arbitrarily large to fit with different privacy levels on
the basis of Proposition 1.
Before discussing how to implement the subspace noise, we
first state the following remark.
Remark 4. (There is always a non-empty subspace for noise
insertion as long as m ≥ n.) Since [C PC] ∈ R2m×2n can
be viewed as a new graph incidence matrix with 2n nodes and
2m edges [27], we thus have dim(H¯) ≤ 2n− 1, and H¯⊥ is
non-empty if m ≥ n.
In DOSP, each node only needs to randomly initialize
its own dual variables {λ(0)i|j }j∈Ni ; we thus have non-zero
subspace noise (I −ΠH¯)λ(0) 6= 0 with probability 1 as long
as m ≥ n. Hence, DOSP does not require any coordination
between nodes for noise construction.
1) Output utility analysis: Beyond not requiring coordi-
nation between nodes, DOSP also ensures full output utility
regardless of the amount of inserted noise [27], because the
updating of the optimization variable x is perpendicular to
subspace H¯⊥ by inspecting (12), i.e.,(
(I −ΠH¯)λ(t)
)>
Cx = 0. (45)
Full output utility is thus achieved.
2) Lower bound analysis: As full output utility is achieved,
the lower bound on DOSP is the same as (25) in the SMPC
based approach.
3) Individual privacy analysis: The information collected
by the adversary throughout the whole algorithm is given by
Vi = {{Sj}j∈Nc ,
∑
j∈N
Sj , {Λ(t)i|j , X(t)}(i,j)∈Ec,t∈T }. (46)
We have the following result which simplifies the privacy
analysis:
I(Si;Vi) =I(Si; {Sj −
∑
k∈Nj,h
Bj|kΛ
(t)
k|j}j∈Nh,t=0,1
|{Sj}j∈Nc , {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j),∈Ec), (47)
where the proof is shown in Appendix C.
We note that, similarly to the above SMPC based approach,
the partial sum in subgraph G′h can also be computed by the
adversary. In fact, the partial sum can be divided into two
parts: ∑
j∈N ′h
Sj =
∑
j∈N ′h,t=0,1
(
Sj −
∑
k∈Nj,h
Bj|kΛ
(t)
k|j
)
+
∑
(j,k)∈E∩N ′h×N ′h,t=0,1
Bj|kΛ
(t)
k|j . (48)
The first term is given by (47). The second term can also
be determined by using (16) and the fact that Bi|jλ
(0)
j|i +
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Bj|iλ
(1)
i|j = Bi|j(λ
(0)
j|i − λ(1)i|j ). Therefore, the partial sum∑
j∈N ′h Sj can be computed by the adversary.
As the partial sum can be computed, the rest analysis
follows a similar line as the above SMPC based approaches
and we conclude that with the proposed metrics, DOSP also
achieves (42). In addition, Remark 3 also holds for DOSP.
VII. COMPARISONS, NUMERICAL RESULTS, AND
DISCUSSION
In this section, we first compare all the above discussed ap-
proaches and then demonstrate their numerical results. Finally,
we will discuss on principles for designing algorithms.
A. Comparisons of existing approaches
In Table I, we compare the discussed approaches in terms
of several important parameters. Firstly, we can see that in the
context of distributed average consensus, SMPC and DOSP
achieve exactly the same performance, except the fact that
SMPC requires coordination between nodes to construct the
sum of noise to zero (i.e., the steps required in (33)). Secondly,
compared to SMPC and DOSP, DP is robust against n − 1
corrupted nodes, but it suffers from a privacy-utility trade-off.
Thirdly, for SMPC and DOSP, ki = di − 1 is only dependent
on neighborhood size di but not on the whole network size. If
the graph is fully connected, it reduces to ki = n− 2. Finally,
when dealing with an eavesdropping adversary, DP is the most
lightweight as it protects privacy even though all transmitted
messages are eavesdropped; while, both SMPC and DOSP
require securely encrypted channels at the initialization step
only to guarantee the noise {ri}i∈Nh is not revealed to the
adversary.
B. Numerical results
The numerical results include two parts: the convergence
behavior analysis, and visualization of both utility and privacy
in terms of mutual information. To do so, we simulated a
geometrical graph with n = 10 nodes, and set the radius as
r2 = 2 lognn to ensure a connected graph with high proba-
bility [54]. For simplicity, all private data have a Gaussian
distribution with unit variance, and all the noise used in the
DP, SMPC and DOSP approaches also follows a Gaussian
distribution with variance σ2.
Fig. 2: Normalized mutual information of output utility, indi-
vidual privacy, and its lower bound for arbitrary honest node
i in terms of the amount of noise insertion by using the DP
based approach.
1) Convergence behavior: In Fig. 1 we present the conver-
gence behaviors of existing algorithms under different amounts
of noise insertion, i.e., different noise variances. There, we
can see that all algorithms can achieve the correct average
if there is no noise, i.e., σ2 = 0; the DOSP and SMPC
based approaches ensure the correct average regardless of the
amount of inserted noise, whereas the accuracy of the DP
based approach is compromised by increasing the amount of
noise insertion.
2) Visualization of both utility and privacy: To validate
the information-theoretic results, i.e., output utility, individual
privacy, and its lower bound, presented in Table I, we ran 104
Monte Carlo simulations and used the non-parametric entropy
estimation toolbox (npeet) [55] to estimate the normalized
mutual information (NMI).
Privacy and utility results of the DP based approach. As
shown in Fig. 2, we can see that lower individual privacy
can be achieved by increasing the noise variance; however,
the output utility will be deteriorated. Hence, Remark 2 is
validated that there is a trade-off between privacy and utility
using the DP based approaches. Additionally, it also shows
that the DP based approaches can not reach perfect individual
privacy as long as there is noise insertion, i.e., σ2 > 0.
Privacy and utility results of the DOSP and SMPC based
approaches. Unlike the DP based approaches, which consider
only the case of n − 1 corrupted nodes, the performances
of SMPC and DOSP are dependent on the number of cor-
rupted nodes in the neighborhood and the graph topology. To
demonstrate this effect, in Fig. 3 (a), we simulated two graphs
satisfying Assumption 2; i.e., every honest node is connected
to at least one corrupted node. The privacy-utility results of the
DOSP and SMPC based approaches under these two graphs
are shown in Fig. 3 (b) and (c) respectively. We validate the
following theoretical results regarding utility and privacy:
• SMPC and DOSP both ensure full utility regardless of
the amount of noise, thus of the privacy level;
• their optimum individual privacy is only related to the
partial sum in subgraph G′h, the connected component
consists of node 1 after removal of all corrupted nodes,
after ensuring the variance of inserted noise is sufficiently
large;
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TABLE I: Comparisons of existing information-theoretic solutions for the distributed average consensus
DP SMPC DOSP
Adversary models Passive, Eavesdropping
Coordinated noise insertion No Yes No
Output utility ui = I(Yi;Yi + R¯) ui = I(Yi;Yi)
Individual privacy ρi = I(Si;Si +R
(0)
i ) ρi = I(Si;
∑
j∈N ′
h
Sj)
Lower bound on individual privacy ρi,min = I(Si;Si +R) ρi,min = I(Si;
∑
j∈Nh Sj)
Maximum number of corrupted nodes ki = n− 1 out of n ki = di − 1 out of di
Channel encryption cost 0 1 1
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3: (a) Two sample graphs in which G′ and G differ in only one edge. Normalized mutual information of output utility,
individual privacy, and its lower bound for honest node 1 in terms of the amount of noise insertion by using SMPC and DOSP
approaches under (b) graph G and (c) graph G′.
• as expected, under graph G they are able to obtain perfect
individual privacy, i.e., Remark 3 is validated.
C. Discussion of principles of algorithm designs
We now provide some implications on how to design appro-
priate algorithms for different applications. A typical way to
design privacy-preserving solutions is to use the off-the-shelf
tools such as DP, SMPC and DOSP. It is thus important to
know their relations before designing solutions. We have the
following result.
Remark 5. (DP and SMPC/DOSP are mutually exclusive for
applications satisfying I(Si; {Sj , Yj}j∈N ,j 6=i) = I(Si;Si).)
The reason is that if DP achieves full utility yˆ = y like SMPC
or DOSP, it is not privacy-preserving at all since ρi,min =
I(Si;Si).
As a consequence, for applications like distributed average
consensus satisfying I(Si; {Sj , Yj}j∈N ,j 6=i) = I(Si;Si), we
have the following suggestions for algorithm designs:
1) If the application requires the algorithm robustness that
each node does not trust any other node in the net-
work, i.e., n− 1 corrupted nodes, then adopt DP based
approaches; be aware that there is a trade-off between
privacy and utility.
2) If the application has very high requirements for the
accuracy of function output, e.g., full utility, then both
SMPC and DOSP are options, but it can not be robust
to n− 1 corrupted nodes.
For the rest of applications, first compute the lower bound
ρi,min = I(Si; {Sj , Yj}j∈Nc) under the condition of obtaining
full utility. After that,
1) if ρi,min is tolerable, then use either SMPC or DOSP
to realize both perfect individual privacy and full output
utility (might be dependent on the graph topology);
2) if ρi,min is not tolerable, one option is to combine SMPC
or DOSP with DP to decrease the lower bound by
compromising the output utility.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we first proposed information-theoretic met-
rics for quantifying the algorithm performance in terms of
output utility, individual privacy and algorithm robustness.
The proposed metrics are general and can reduce to well-
known frameworks including SMPC and DP under certain
conditions. Then we derived several theoretical results in
terms of mutual information. In particular, the lower bound
on individual privacy indicates the best privacy level can
possibly be achieved before designing algorithms. Moreover,
with a concrete example we explicitly analyzed, compared
and related the state-of-the-art algorithms including DP, SMPC
and DOSP. Furthermore, we also visualized all the theoretical
results with numerical validations.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. As the private data S is independent of noise R, we
have σ2Z = σ
2
S + σ
2
R. Let γ = 1/σZ and define Z
′ = γZ.
Since mutual information is invariant of scaling, we have
lim
σ2R→∞
I(S;Z) = lim
γ→0
I(γS;Z ′) = 0.
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We thus conclude that as long as  > 0, there exists noise R
with variance σ2R <∞ that satisfies I(S;Z) = .
If the noise R is Gaussian distributed, we can achieve
arbitrary small information leakage I(S;Z) =  as long as
σ2R ≥ σ
2
S
22−1 . The proof goes as follows:
 = I(S;Z) = h(Z)− h(Z|S)
= h(Z)− h(R)
(a)
= h(Z)− 1
2
log(2pieσ2R)
(b)
≤ 1
2
log(2pieσ2Z)−
1
2
log(2pieσ2R)
=
1
2
log(1 + σ2S/σ
2
R),
where h(·) denotes the differential entropy; (a) holds as
the differential entropy of a Gaussian random variable with
variance σ2 is given by 12 log(2pieσ
2); (b) holds, because the
maximum entropy of a random variable with fixed variance is
achieved by a Gaussian distribution. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof.
I(Si;Vi)
(a)
= I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc ,
∑
j∈N
Sj , {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec , X(0))
(b)
= I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc , {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec , X(0))
(c)
= I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc , {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec , {X(0)j }j∈Nh)
(d)
= I(Si; {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec , {X(0)j }j∈Nh)
(e)
= I(Si; {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec , {Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h
Rj|k +
∑
k∈Nj,c
Rj|k}j∈Nh)
(f)
= I(Si; {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec , {Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h
Rj|k}j∈Nh)
(g)
= I(Si; {Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h
Rj|k}j∈Nh)
(h)
= I(Si; {Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h
Rj|k}j∈N ′h),
where (a) holds, as ∀t ≥ 1 : Si → X(0) →
X(t) forms a Markov chain (similarly to Remark 1);
(b) holds, as
∑
j∈N Sj can be determined by X
(0), i.e.,∑
j∈N Sj =
∑
j∈N X
(0)
j ; (c) holds, as {X(0)j }j∈Nc can
be determined by {Sj}j∈Nc , {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec using (23), (34)
and (33); (d) holds because {Sj}j∈Nc is independent of
{Rji}(i,j)∈Ec , {X(0)j }j∈Nh and Si; (e) holds by represent-
ing {X(0)j }j∈Nh by using (23) and (33); (f) follows, as
{∑k∈Nj,c Rj|k}j∈Nh can be determined by {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec by
using (34); (g) holds, as {Rji}(i,j)∈Ec is independent of
both Si and {Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h Rj|k}j∈Nh ; and (h) holds, as{Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h Rj|k}j∈Nh\N ′h is independent of both Si and{Sj +
∑
k∈Nj,h Rj|k}j∈N ′h . 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF EQUATION (47)
Proof. First consider two successive x-updates in (13) and
plug in (17):
x(t+1) − x(t−1) = (I + cC>C)−1(
−2cC>PCx(t) − 2cC>Cx(t−1)
)
. (49)
We have
I(Si;Vi)
(a)
= I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc , {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec , {X(t)}t∈T )
(b)
= I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc , {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec , {X(t)}t=1,2)
(c)
= I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc , {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec , {X(t)j }j∈Nh,t=1,2)
(d)
= I(Si; {Sj}j∈Nc , {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec
, {Sj −
∑
k∈Nj,h
Bj|kΛ
(t)
k|j}j∈Nh,t=0,1)
(e)
= I(Si; {Sj −
∑
k∈Nj,h
Bj|kΛ
(t)
k|j}j∈Nh,t=0,1
|{Sj}j∈Nc , {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec)
where (a) holds, as all {Λ(t>0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec can be determined
by {X(t)}t∈T and {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec from (14); (b) holds, as all
{X(t)}t>2 can be determined by {X(t)}t=1,2 on the basis of
(49) (note that we omit X(0) by assuming x is initialized with
all zeros); (c) holds, as {X(2)j }j∈Nc can be constructed by
using {Sj}j∈Nc , X(1), {Λ(1)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec based on (15), in which
the last set can be determined on the basis of (a), and similarly
{X(1)j }j∈Nc can be constructed by {Sj}j∈Nc , {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec ;
(d) also follows from (15); and (e) follows from the definition
of conditional mutual information and Si being independent
of both {Sj}j∈Nc and {Λ(0)i|j }(i,j)∈Ec . 
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